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Making Capitalism Work: The Dubious 
Dichotomy Between Welfare and Workfare1
 
Johannes D. Schmidt and Jacques Hersh2
 
A negro is a negro. In certain circumstances he becomes a slave. 
A mule is a machine for spinning cotton. Only under certain 
circumstances does it become capital. Outside these 
circumstances, it is no more capital than gold is intrinsically 
money, or sugar is the price of sugar…. Capital is a social 
relation of production. It is a historical relation of production. 
          Karl Marx3
 
Globalization as a concept describing the intensified process of universalization 
of capitalist relations has been associated with neoliberalism as its ideological 
discourse. According to this dominant ideology’s recommendations for policy-
making, efforts should be directed toward the retrenchment of state intervention 
in the socio-economic sphere of welfare capitalism and of industrial strategy of 
the capitalist developmental state. This represents a radical departure from 
formerly accepted norms.  
 
As far as the welfare dimension of capitalism is concerned, the dominant 
ideological discourse has been transformed from one of praise for the most 
productive phase of capitalism to one of blaming the Keynesian macro-
economic model for the difficulties, which emerged, by the early l970s. Riding 
on the back of globalization, the ideology of neo-conservatism set out to undo 
the compromises, which characterized post-World War II liberal capitalism. 
According to the new discourse, ”What were until recently measures of 
capitalism’s achievements were redefined as responsible for the end of the 
golden age and as unaffordable barriers to capital accumulation”(Gindin 2002, 6 
[MR]).  
 
A similar paradigmatic shift took place with regard to the interpretation of the 
East Asian capitalist developmental state model. The conventional interpretation 
concerning the successful experiences of the New Industrialized Economies was 
that they were the result of the adoption of an export-oriented strategy with low 
levels of ”price distortion” through state intervention with market mechanisms. 
                                           
1 This paper is a revised version of a talk given at the international workshop “Globalization, 
New Technologies and Social Well-being, 4-6 April 2002 
2 Associate Professor and Professor at DIR 
3 “Lohnarbeit und Kapital, N.Rh.Z.(No.266, April 7, 1849) in Marx 1887/1890[1961], p.766, 
n.3 
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This was however challenged within mainstream development economics by the 
institutionalists. According to the latter the state had in fact interfered by 
”getting the price wrong” (Amsden 1992) and by ”governing the market” (Wade 
1990) in order to gain a better position in the world economy. However, 
influenced by the neoliberalism of the so-called Washington Consensus, the 
international institutions adhered to the position that the market mechanisms had 
proved their strength in spite of government interference all through the high 
growth period. Nevertheless, after having grudgingly acknowledged a certain 
positive role of the East Asian state, when the crisis hit the region in the latter 
part of the 1990s, it was ascribed to cronyism—that is a form corruption and 
market distortion made possible by the state. The suggested remedy was the 
neoliberal medicine whereby the role of the state would be retrenched –not only 
with regard to development strategy but social policy making as well. 
 
While the anti-statist premises of neoliberalism have been accepted (willingly in 
the West European arena and more reluctantly in the case of East Asia) 
differences in adjustment can still be perceived as far as the speed and scope of 
this deconstruction is concerned. Consequently, in order to understand the roots 
and nature of these differences, attention must be paid to the variety of historical 
experiences in the distinct forms of capitalist construction as well as the specific 
socio-political balance of forces between societal agencies and actors.  
 
Thus although neoliberal globalization aims at creating social policy 
convergence, existing differences reflect the persistence of societal 
arrangements which were implemented in the various exemplars of industrial 
capitalism as well as explaining the unevenness in the degrees and scope of the 
deconstruction processes which can be observed. These differences 
notwithstanding, given the difficulties facing the models of industrial capitalism, 
the adoption of the discourse of neoliberalism has resulted in a similarity of 
economic and social policies.  
 
Historical Capitalism: Industrial Paths and Social Strategies 
Economic history shows that the institutional arrangements and social policy, 
which were historically established in the context of the evolving specific 
capitalist societies to a large extent, depended on the socio-economic and 
political background of each. External possibilities and constraints of course 
also played an important role. Inherent differences in the trajectories 
notwithstanding, the common denominator for industrial capitalism was the 
concern for creating an environment conducive to a synergy between capital 
accumulation, economic growth and industrialism. The variation of societal 
arrangements was initially determined by the fact that ever since the Industrial 
Revolution in England, the so-called ”late developers” were forced to innovate, 
not only with regard to industrial and trade strategy, but equally with regard to 
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social policy. This was related to the fact that capitalism being an international 
system from the very beginning compelled national capitalist systems to emerge 
in opposition to the leading nation’s intentions. 
 
The German economist, Friedrich List, who played an important role in the 
formulation of his country’s economic policy, described this mechanism in the 
following manner: ”It is one of the vulgar tricks of history that when one nation 
reaches the pinnacle of its development is should attempt to remove the ladder 
by which it had mounted in order to prevent others from following.” 
(Clairmonte 1960:47; Chang 2002:4). 
 
While the state played a decisive role in the evolution of Britain as the leading 
industrial and trading power, the significance of the politics of capitalist 
development later became obscured by the doctrine of laissez-faire and free 
trade; ie.what Friedrich List called the ”cosmopolitan economy” of Adam Smith 
(List [1895] 1977). Realizing the importance of politics, the ideology and 
strategy of the political economy of ”catching-up” came to build on the 
ideological foundations of ”economic nationalism” rather than on liberalism. 
Although the theoretical framework of ”late development” evolved within the 
framework of the Listian conceptualization, the concrete example of the United 
States protecting her ”infant industries” from Britain’s trading relations was a 
determinant in tracing the path of ”catching-up”. From the perspective of ”late 
development”, the teachings of what came to be known as the German school 
had perhaps an even more profound impact on the industrialization processes of 
nations in Europe and Asia than either the teachings of Karl Marx or Adam 
Smith (Lind 1998). In fact, during the nineteenth century, the strategy of ”late 
development” --which in contrast to the ideology of economic liberalism to a 
larger extent relied on the role of the state -- spread from Europe (including 
Russia) to extra-European nations like China, Japan, Korea and other countries 
while Indian nationalists readily drew inspiration from the same source 
(Szporluk 1988). 
 
The purpose of bringing to mind the historical experience of a variety of paths to 
industrialization is to indicate that differences among societies adhering to 
capitalism have been due to what, within the Marxian tradition, has been 
described as the ”law of uneven development”. The mechanisms behind this 
process were related to the capacity of societies to establish socio-political 
arrangements capable of mobilizing internal human and material resources while 
constraining the negative impacts of world market forces without missing 
conjunctural and structural opportunities, which the international economy 
might offer at specific moments. Understood in this manner, the centrality of 
capitalism is comprehended as more than an unembedded economic system. 
Capital formation, accumulation and absorption are thus not only processes 
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leading to the establishment of economic institutions but from the outset depend 
on the political and ideological arrangements in society. In the last instance, 
capital is a (politically mediated) social relation.  
 
The form of political interference in the socio-economic sphere during the 
industrialization process has traditionally depended on various internal and 
external factors. Thus Polanyi reminds us that the struggle between agrarian 
capitalism and industrial capitalism in England gave rise to the paradox that it 
was through social legislation in the manufacturing sector that the ruin of 
agriculture was postponed for an entire generation. It was Tory socialism and 
the conservative landlords of England, which pushed through more humane 
conditions for the industrial laborer. ”The Ten Hours Bill of 1847, which Karl 
Marx hailed as the first victory of socialism, was the work of enlightened 
reactionaries” with workers having little say in their own fate (Polanyi [l944] 
l957, 166). 
 
On the European continent, where industrialization was taking place in the 
context of a process of national unity formation, such as in the cases of 
Germany, Italy and smaller Eastern European states, the working classes were 
deemed to be an important political factor for the project. The result was that 
proto-socialist measures concerning social legislation and nationalizations were 
introduced in order to mobilize the support of the working population for the 
centralization of the state and imperial unity. As Polanyi notes: ”Bismark made 
a bid for the unification of the Second Reich through the introduction of an 
epochal scheme of social legislation.” (Polanyi [1944] 1957:177) In contrast to 
Anglo-Saxon conservatism, European conservatism believed in the 
responsibility of the state for the socio-economic well-being of the nation. 
Ramesh Misra, who makes the above point, notes the following paradox: ”Thus 
it is worth emphasizing that this –the world’s first—welfare state was initiated in 
1889, not by socialists but by Conservative statesmen in order to secure 
economic and social stability and to protect the community from the social 
consequences of laissez-faire” (Misra 1996:321). 
 
Awareness that nascent capitalism was both morally limited and politically 
vulnerable very early brought to the fore the issue of responding to this 
challenge. Social responsibility combined with the realization of the miseries 
inflicted by industrial capitalism was not the monopoly of anticapitalist 
statesmen. Thus, the French aristocrat Montesquieu expressed concern for the 
viability of the new social system by expressing an early argument for the 
welfare state: 
     
The state owes to every citizen an assured subsistence, proper nourishment, 
suitable clothing, and a mode of life not incompatible with health … whether it 
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is to prevent the people from suffering, or whether it be to prevent them from 
revolting (Montesquieu, in Gindin, 2002). 
 
Political Economy as a Tool of Analysis 
While economic history is useful in understanding the variety of paths to 
industrial capitalism, political economy –in the Ricardian  sense of the term —as 
the scientific analysis of the creation and distribution of the economic surplus 
among the factors of production represents a fundamental element in 
comprehending the evolution of modern (industrialized) societies. In this 
relation, a comprehensive theoretical perspective focusing on the interactions of 
agencies like the state, capital and labor in advanced societies, in the context of 
the international system, is offered by the ”regulation theory” of the French 
school (Aglietta 1979) and by the theory of ”social structures of accumulation” 
(SSA) as proposed by Bowles, Gordon and Weiskopf (1984). Common to both 
analytical frameworks is their assumption that capitalism’s societal 
contradictions are contained or regulated at different stages by specific structural 
arrangements which according to the SSA approach exist both on the domestic 
and international levels:  
 
The domestic institutions may include the state of labor-industrial relations; the 
organization of the work process; the character of industrial organization; the 
role of money and banking and their relation to industry; the role of the state in 
the economy; the line-up of political parties; the state of race and gender 
relations; and the character of the dominant culture and ideology. The 
international institutions may concern the trade, investment, monetary-financial, 
and political environments (Kotz, McDonough, and Reich 1994: 1).  
 
At the time of the faltering post-World War II boom in the 1970s, David Gordon 
(1988) concluded his discussion of the difficulties facing the international 
capitalist economy at the time by pointing out that inflation and chaos in world 
currency markets made capital accumulation dependent on certain institutional 
foundations. The intellectual traditions, which influenced this theoretical 
approach, belong to the Marxian theories of historical materialism, exploitation, 
surplus creation, and economic crisis including the interdependence of the 
economic, political and ideological aspects of a society. The Keynesian 
preoccupation with the uncertainty behind investment decisions also influenced 
the conceptualization of SSA, as has the traditionalist school of American 
economics descending from the contributions of Thorstein Veblen and John R. 
Commons at the beginning of the 20th century. The long-wave theories of 
capitalist upturns and downturns as pioneered by N.D. Kondratieff and Joseph 
Schumpeter equally shaped the point of departure of SSA as originally 
formulated by David Gordon. This analytical framework, which originated from 
the analysis of the institutionalization of the economy of the United States, does 
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not mean that the same concepts may be mechanically transposed to the analysis 
of other societies (Kotz, McDonough and Reich 1994: 4-5). This 
notwithstanding, its heuristic value deserves attention as it opens for 
understanding variations in the types of SSAs in different examples of capitalist 
societies. 
 
In contrast to this framework which tries to conceptualize differences in the 
economic growth of countries by looking not only at the relationship between 
structures, agencies and factors of production but at the organization of society, 
the new economic orthodoxy of neoliberalism offers another take. Here the 
economic sphere is singled out as the main determinant in explaining both 
economic growth as well as growth rate differentials between countries. In the 
words of David Coates: 
 
In that dominant paradigm, economic growth is explained as a 
consequence of the freeing of market forces and the associated 
development of appropriate factors of production; and 
differences in growth performance are explained as by-products 
of the degree of market freedom achieved and of the resulting 
differences in factor quantity and quality (Coates 2000:6). 
 
Typology of Industrialized Capitalist Societies 
Although the two approaches may appear as mutually exclusive in both 
explanations and recommendations, their combination may help explore the 
modus operandi of the different capitalist societal prototypes. There are 
essentially three ideal types of industrial capitalism, which can still be analyzed 
on their own merits in spite of the hegemonic position in the policy-making 
institutions which neoliberalism has achieved. 
 
1.  The market-led type of capitalism principally identified with the United 
States and the United Kingdom is generically speaking seen as ”neo-
American” or ”Anglo-Saxon” capitalism (Albert, 1993). The basic 
characteristic, as related to the accumulation of capital and societal 
arrangements, is that economic decisions are overwhelmingly left to the 
discretion of private actors who are given the space and opportunities of 
maximizing the short-term profitability of the enterprise and to raise needed 
capital in available financial markets. As far as the socio-political dimension 
is concerned, labor enjoys, in this type of society, limited legal industrial and 
social rights, with workers’ livelihood depending on the wage they can 
negotiate with employers in a more or less unregulated labor market. With 
regard to state involvement in the economic sphere it is primarily centered 
on creating and protecting a favorable environment for markets. In these 
societal arrangements, politics, morality and ideology lean towards 
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promoting individualism and liberalism. In the laissez-faire model of US 
capitalism, the role of the state with regard to social protection is one of 
minimal allocations to low-income groups. Private insurance schemes are 
worked out at the place of employment. In contrast, the British system has 
had a more social democratic form of social provision, which however has 
been undermined ever since the era of Margaret Thatcher. 
 
2.  The second model is what has been categorized as state-led capitalism. Also 
in this type of society, decision-making at the micro-level of accumulation is 
understood to be the privilege and responsibility of the private enterprise. 
But in contrast to market-led capitalism, strategic business decisions are 
made in collaboration and contact with public agencies and often indirectly 
arrived at through the administrative guidance of central planning organs 
and state leadership of the banking system. In these capitalist societies, labor 
organizations and movements lack strong political and social rights as well 
as representativeness. While the space for labor bargaining ties some 
workers to private corporations through enterprise-based welfare benefits, 
employment conditions in family and medium-sized factories are more 
precarious. The ideological hegemony of the ruling elite, which influences 
the management of society, is most likely to be based on some variant of 
economic nationalism. Socially and politically, there is an alliance between 
the bureaucracy, industry/business and the governing political party. Having 
excluded the participation of organized labor at the macro decision-making 
level this is regarded as corporatism without labor. The rationale for this 
arrangement is based on the imperative of late industrialization and 
”catching-up” which legitimize the social control posture of semi-
authoritarian or authoritarian regimes. The prototype of state-led capitalism 
in the aftermath of the Second World War has been that of Japanese society 
and that of South Korea after the Korean War. These cases, together with 
Taiwan, were later joined by countries in Southeast Asia and are considered 
to be representative of a particular variant of capitalism known as the model 
of ”Asian capitalism” or the ”developmental state” form. It is often 
erroneously assumed that in contrast to Western social formations, East 
Asian countries have been inherently low conflict societies. Such an 
interpretation, which tends to give priority to cultural factors, shows a lack 
of respect for historical facts. It should not be forgotten that social peace in 
modern Asia was achieved through a mix of foreign military interventions 
and internal authoritarianism. Economic growth served to legitimize political 
repression. There are of course significant variations between these societies 
and therefore making the applicability of the term ”Asian model” an 
overstatement. Furthermore, the economic and financial crises, which hit the 
area in the second half of the l990s, revealed fundamental weaknesses of 
both Japan and most of East Asia with the political fallouts still in gestation. 
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3.  The third type of industrial capitalism can be referred to as negotiated or 
consensual capitalism. Its basic characteristic is that, whereas the degree of 
direct state regulation of capital accumulation may be limited, the political 
system allows a series of workers’ rights and social welfare; organized labor 
is accepted as a market actor who to some extent has participated in macro 
decision-making. Thus in comparison to the fore mentioned state-led variant 
of capitalism, the corporatism of consensual capitalist society does include 
labor. Culturally and ideologically, these capitalisms have tended to be 
either social-democratic or Christian democratic. These types of political 
parties had to compete for the allegiance of the working classes and aside a 
strong anti-communist bias internally, they have been antagonistic towards 
the Soviet Union and pro-American externally. Although differences are 
discernable –especially with regard to income equality or gender equality-- 
the Scandinavian ”welfare state” models as well as the West German 
”Sozialmarktwirtschaft” have been considered as exemplars of this capitalist 
variant under the label of ”European welfare capitalism” or the ”Rhineland 
model” (Albert 1993).   
 
Similarities and Differences Between Welfare State and Developmental 
State 
Determining for the economic strategy and social policy implemented in the 
different post-war types of capitalism, has been the manner in which the 
decision-making processes had to take societal pressures into account. In the 
European context, the response was influenced by the need to rekindle growth 
after the hardships of the Great Depression and the destructions of the Second 
World War. This had to be done in a manner capable of neutralizing the 
militancy of the postwar working class generation, whose frame of reference of 
capitalism was precisely the costs these two events had wrought on the 
populations. In addition, the example of the Soviet Union and other state 
socialist formations played a key role, going through, at the time, a dynamic 
recovery period while paying attention to employment and the welfare of their 
population.  
 
In the case of Asia, Japan was submitted to more or less similar internal 
pressures as those experienced by European nations. At the same time, the 
political and economic elite was driven by the ambition of ”catching-up”. In the 
rest of that continent, after having achieved decolonization through political 
mobilization led by anticapitalist national liberation movements, the 
normalization of conditions favorable to capitalism had to be different. After the 
United States, during the military occupation of Japan followed by direct and 
indirect interventions on the Asia continent, had succeeded in neutralizing the 
socialist thrust which was perceived as especially serious after the victory of the 
Chinese Communist Party, the task of the pro-American regimes of the region, 
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was to evolve economic and industrial strategies that could pacify the demands 
of the populations and the aspirations of the political elites in order to achieve a 
degree of ”catching-up”.(Hersh 1993)  This was especially the case for South 
Korea and Taiwan who in the 1950s and 1960s were exposed to the examples of 
socialist construction in Asia that at the time demonstrated an undeniable 
relative vitality(Brun and Hersh 1976). 
 
The contrast between welfare capitalism and developmental capitalism as two 
types of capitalism having made a virtue of state intervention in the workings of 
the socio-economic system is thus a function of the differences in their socio-
political backgrounds. The European countries implemented Keynesian 
macroeconomic management, supplemented by a welfare dimension, in order to 
satisfy the expectations of the populations and rehabilitate the credibility of 
capitalism after the traumatic experience of the war. In Asia, the choice was 
made that the strategic intervention of the state in the economy would be more 
radical than European Keynesianism and serve to promote a constructed 
ideology of the national interest. Under these conditions there was limited 
concern for the welfare aspect. As Ankie Hoogvelt points out, the differences 
between the two state strategies revolved around the tackling of the market and 
the social question: 
 
… the developmentalist state has a role different from that of the 
Keynesian welfare state in the already advanced countries. The 
Keynesian welfare state serves to restrain market rationality by 
measures to protect groups vulnerable to the consequences of 
market rationality. By contrast, the developmentalist state 
restrains market rationality in order to pursue a policy for 
industrialisation per se (Hoogvelt 1997: 206). 
 
This interpretation of state intervention in each type of socio-economic 
arrangements influencing their specific Social Structures of Accumulation needs 
to be moderated in order to encompass the differences in social policies, which 
have characterized the exemplars of capitalism. Although it is necessary to keep 
the distinction between social democracy and social authoritarianism in mind, 
both may be seen through the prism of politics as forms of social control. 
Viewed in this manner, Western welfare states are far from uniform in the way 
they administer the social dimension and have to be defined according to the 
class politics characterizing the different types (Esping-Andersen 1990).  
 
In liberal market regimes, such as in the United States, there is a residual (some 
would say minimal) participation of the state in disbursement of welfare benefits 
and a greater reliance on private, philanthropic activities of relief for the needy. 
In the Christian Democratic model characterized by its conservative and 
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corporatist vantage point of departure, welfare benefits are derived from 
income-related insurance packages and entitlement to state provisions, through 
insurance contributions paid by the employees from their earnings; housewives 
and others who are not in the labor market are thus in a more volatile situation. 
In the Social Democratic ideal type model, welfare provision is universalistic 
and encompasses all citizens (some call this welfare state maximalist). Under 
this system of social security, universal coverage of needs is funded through 
taxation. The trade-off between high taxes and a relatively high degree of 
generalized welfare entitlements and services revealed itself to be strongest at a 
time of high economic growth and weaker at a time when unemployment 
becomes a problem. In Asia, there is a relatively underdeveloped welfare 
system, which differs considerably from the varying mixes of private and public 
welfare arrangements mentioned. Here family support networks have fulfilled an 
important social function (See Esping-Andersen in Hersh and Schmidt). 
 
Globalization: The Revenge of the Market 
Understanding the welfare state politically reveals very important aspects, which 
relate industrial capitalism to the fundamental relationship between agencies and 
actors. Karl Polanyi (1944) recognized that before capitalism, the economic 
sphere of all human societies was embedded in social relations, while under 
modern industrial capitalism the market is considered to be a separate and 
dominating entity. Based on the experience of the Great Depression and the 
Second World War, whose origins could be traced to the generalization of 
economic liberalism following World War I, Polanyi warned against the liberal 
utopia of the self-regulating market which if generalized is a prescription for 
disaster. 
 
It is often forgotten that capitalism’s fundamental mechanism of ”creative 
destruction” (Schumpeter [1943] 1976, chapt. VII), involving treating human 
labor power and nature as expendable commodities and sources of profits, 
requires in a dialectical relationship both social measures to remedy the 
destructive imperatives while at the same time demanding circumscriptions of 
these same social limitations for the system to unfold. This dichotomy was 
present from the beginning of (industrial) capitalism where the damage to the 
social fabric had to be remedied. With the breakdown of traditional agricultural 
economies and communities confronting the establishment of capitalist market 
relations involving the expropriation of people’s former livelihood, a need arose 
for dealing with the problem of relief for the destitutes. In this connection, 
public arrangements to cushion the social consequences of the societal mutation 
led to the emergence, in Northern Europe and England, of what has been called 
”the new statecraft dealing with destitution” (Webb and Webb 1963; Piven and 
Clovard 1987:8). 
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This solicitude on the part of the authorities was as touched upon above self-
serving, that is associated with the concern for social order as well as for the 
reproduction of the labor force: 
 
Seen from that vantage point, the Tudor system of poor relief 
was the beginning of a long series of measures, including the 
welfare state, which have been adopted at various times 
throughout the history of capitalism to compensate for its own 
destructive, and self-destructive, logic (Wood 1998: 28). 
 
Thus, in a comparative historical context, protection from the vagaries of market 
capitalism is no innovation of golden age welfare capitalism. During the process 
of capitalist industrialization in Europe, revolts or class wars became a concern 
of the political elites turning social policy into preemptive strikes against the 
working class movement. (Offe 2000:68) As Asa Briggs describes it, the 
Bismarkian welfare concerns were more than mere philanthropy: 
 
It has been suggested that Bismark was influenced by Napoleon 
III’s successful handling of social policy as an instrument of 
politics. He certainly spent time seeking ’an alternative to 
socialism’ and it was this aspect of his policy, which gave what 
he, did contemporary controversial significance throughout 
Europe (Briggs 2000:24).  
 
The interaction of the forces pushing in the direction of freewheeling capitalism 
with the forces needing protection, to a large extent not only determines the 
regime type but also the kind of welfare system. The importance of politics can 
hardly be overestimated. In the case of the Western variant of capitalism, the 
elite agreed, in the post-World War II period, to a compact with labor on the 
basis of the welfare state. Dominating concerns were the fear of social 
revolution, the availability of a disciplined labor force, perhaps a degree of 
social compassion on the part of the rich and of course the competition for 
power between political parties and pressure groups. The balance of forces 
between social groups and the degree of working class consciousness and ethical 
solidarity explain the differences in the establishment of either the residual 
(minimal) or the institutional (maximal) welfare state (Titmus [1968] 2000).  
 
Besides these political-sociological aspects, the environment of economic 
reconstruction during the ”golden age” provided greater possibilities for what 
appeared to be a compact between capital and labor based on Keynesian 
macroeconomics. At the same time, the apparent success of this most dynamic 
period of industrial capitalism ever, tended to obscure the impact, which the 
Second World War and the postwar reconstruction period had had on recreating 
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the conditions for productive activities and employment in contrast to the 
worldwide economic depression of the 1930s. Reintroducing this aspect into the 
discussion permits a more sober evaluation of the welfare state. A concept, 
which has tended to mystify the dynamism of this period by detaching it from its 
specific background (Magdoff 1998:2-3). 
 
A source of discord within social sciences has been the question of whether the 
social arrangement and compromise between labor and capital initiated the 
golden age of capitalism or whether it was the release of economic growth in 
connection with World War II and the postwar recovery that created the 
economic boom which made the welfare policies possible. Nor did welfare 
regimes in the West question the international division of labor, which permitted 
exploitation of the post-colonial world and access to necessary natural resources 
for industrial production. Consequently the critical appraisal of the Keynesian 
welfare state refocuses the political and social significance of the construct by 
including the material and economic background for the evolution of capitalist 
industrial formations during the second half of the 20th century. Such an 
approach allows for a more skeptical assessment of the golden age of capitalism. 
This notwithstanding, and without falling into the trap of ultra-radicalism, it has 
to be recognized that social and political pressures paved the way for a so-called 
social compact albeit without challenging the dominant position of capital 
whether in the short run or the long run, neither internally nor externally. With 
hindsight, the opposite may be argued to have been the case. Thus, some 
analysts on the left reached the conclusion that the welfare aspect of postwar 
capitalism was merely a palliative or shock absorber in order to lure the working 
class away from its revolutionary vocation. (Saville 1957 in Macgregor 
1999:99-101) Seen in this light the benefits, which were attained by the workers, 
were part of the price paid by the property-owning class for not having their 
privileged position challenged. As Ramesh Misra put it: 
 
A distinctive feature of the welfare state has been its success in 
meeting both the accumulation needs and the legitimation 
deficits of post-Second World War capitalism…. A major reason 
why business interests and the political right came to accept the 
modern system of welfare entitlements was that it helped to 
legitimize market capitalism… (Misra 1996: 325). 
 
A more nuanced approach considered the social reforms as valuable gains in 
terms of improving the conditions of the majority. Viewed through this prism, 
the political weakness of the welfare strategy was not the attainment of benefits 
for the working classes but the relegation of the objective of socialism by the 
leading forces within organized labor and social democracy. (Thompson 1958 in 
MacGregor 1999:99-l01) On balance, however, the positive was seen as 
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outweighing the negative. The basic argument behind this position was that ”the 
provision of services on the basis of need rather than ability to pay is a 
profoundly anti-capitalist concept” (MacGregor 1999:99).   
 
Seeing welfare regimes as the outcome of economic and political imperatives 
for the functioning of capitalist industrial societies under specific conditions 
does not automatically signify that their scope and reach are predetermined. The 
differences in benevolence and inclusivity as well as democratic foundations of 
these regimes have to be explained as functions of societal agencies and social 
actors who are also influenced by their societies’ (political) culture. Although 
social control is inherent to this type of industrial societies, it can take various 
forms. While the end result of social well-being may very well involve 
neutralization of dissent and dissatisfaction it might be preferable for the 
populations compared to more coercive type regimes. Given its adaptability, the 
ruling class may, under specific conditions, well be willing to impose its 
hegemony by means of consensual corporatism whereby labor is also included. 
As Susanne MacGregor points out: 
 
The problem with condemning welfare states as being only about 
regulating the poor is that such theories fail to distinguish 
between social democracy and social authoritarianism. There are 
harsher alternatives to welfare states, as the US move towards the 
incarceration of the poor and young blacks demonstrates 
(MacGregor 1999: 100). 
 
Another case in point is to compare the Western welfare state to the Asian 
workfare state as it developed under the catching-up process of the East Asian 
societies. However, even prior to the launching of the notion of globalization in 
the beginning of the 1990s, it had become obvious that the trade-off between 
welfare benefits and capital accumulation was in difficulty due to the faltering of 
the postwar boom, the recovery of the Western European and Japanese 
economies as well as the emergence of the New Industrial Countries (NICs) 
especially of East Asia. The growing competition between the different 
industrial entities put the Asian economies at an advantage because of their type 
of SSA, which had relied on strong state guidance of the private sector and 
relatively speaking low wage levels and public spending in the social sector. The 
special feature of life-long employment at the level of the large enterprises also 
served to atomize the working class since employees at small or medium size 
shops didn’t have similar guaranties. Seen in the international context, the 
argument can perhaps be made that the Western welfare state made the viability 
of the export-oriented workfare state of the East possible and that the ruling 
classes of both made use of the other’s societal construction in order to 
legitimize their own ideological hegemony. 
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In sum, as both the West European welfare state and the East Asian 
developmental states are two variants of capitalist society their relationship to 
the market determine their socio-political strategies. While the Keynesian 
welfare state thus limits the social consequences of market rationality by 
implementing measures to protect weak groups, the developmental state curbs 
market rationality as part of an industrialization strategy, which puts less 
emphasis on the less privileged. (See Hoogvelt 1997: 206) In addition the 
regime form in the two type societies is to a certain determined by the balance of 
power between the socio-political actors. In the welfare state case, the strong 
labor force is co-opted in the democratic process while the restive social forces 
in the developmental state are submitted to outright military regimes or to soft 
authoritarianism.  
 
National Competition: Adjusting to Neoliberal Globalization  
With the entrance of the third millennium, an interesting aspect of the 
international political economy is that all models of capitalist structures of 
accumulation now encounter a commonality of difficulties. The growth rates of 
their economies, which in the past were rather high, have given way to mediocre 
productivity increases, price competition, and relatively low profit margins on 
productive capital. The response of corporate capital has been unidimensional: 
achieve a better wage bargain or threaten to relocate where conditions for 
surplus extraction are more favorable with less environmental regulations as 
well. This is the formula for increased competition by other means between 
different industrial capitalist groups as well as different working classes not only 
at the national level but also on the international plan. This is done with the 
intention of (re)establishing the supremacy of capital over labor, which during 
the ”golden age” had achieved some improvements both at the workplace and 
also at the societal level generally. In the words of an American labor activist: 
 
Capitalism has been defined by both competition among 
capitalists and competition among workers. Workers regularly 
compete with one another for limited resources –specifically, for 
jobs and income. Capitalists initiate this competition to depress 
wages and working conditions and to insure that, in the struggle 
between capital and labor, capital is supreme (Hassan 2000:60). 
 
Followed to its logical conclusion, this constitutes the backbone of what can be 
described as the preferred strategy of neoliberalism. Left to the vagaries of the 
market after the weakening of organized labor, especially in the West, this is a 
prescription which contains the elements of a race to the bottom leading to a 
situation which acerbates the inherent tendencies towards overproduction: 
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… the spread across the capitalist bloc of neo-liberal policies of 
keeping wage increases below productivity growth and pushing 
down domestic costs has led to an unstable vicious circle of 
”competitive austerity”: each country reduces domestic demand 
and adopts an export-oriented strategy of dumping its surplus 
production …. This has created a global demand crisis and the 
growth of surplus capacity across the business cycle (Albo 1994: 
147).     
 
Due to the dominance of the neoliberal discourse on globalization within its own 
ranks and that of the political parties on the left, organized labor has shown a 
tendency of accepting the assumptions and prescriptions of the dominant 
ideology with no vision of an alternative. Simultaneously however, ”the models 
have stopped working. They have stopped working as engines of growth and 
capital accumulation; and they have stopped working as providers of secure 
employment and rising private and social wage for the bulk of their 
populations….” (Coates 2000:250) What we see is that the societal 
arrangements reached through the trade-offs during the ”golden age” are 
submitted to pressures calling for adjustment to the perceived or real demands of 
globalization. As a result, the former US capital-labor accord, the specific 
Japanese life-long employment system and the European welfare state are at 
risk. In the three models, workers have experienced similar fallouts from the 
implementation of neoliberal policies: frozen or decreasing real wage levels, 
increasing job insecurity, and intensified work processes. Also welfare 
entitlements have come under increased pressure and, depending on the political 
balance of power in the specific countries, these rights have been significantly 
reduced.  
 
At the societal level, the political forces accepting the thesis of the ”borderless 
world” (Ohmae 1990), which is a fundamental element of the globalization 
discourse including its policy recommendations as imperatives, have been 
instrumental in imposing ”a standard framework of requirements on all national 
capitalisms, so squeezing (to the point of oblivion) the space for a variety of 
capitalist models, and requiring that the remaining space be occupied by 
deregulated (that is, by liberal market) capitalisms”(Coates 2000: 251). 
 
The paradox in the present discussion of the fate of welfare capitalism is that it 
has given way to a variant of workfare capitalism in the West, while at the same 
time Western discourse has put welfare measures on the agenda of economic 
policy-making by the EA NICs and Japan. Neoliberalism thus reveals a Janus 
face in its contradictory recommendations to Western and Eastern governments. 
At present, however, no ideal-type growth model of capitalism manages to catch 
the imagination of governing elites or working classes. It is in this vacuum that a 
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new hybrid of social policy-making is emerging within the Western social 
democratic paradigm, ie. the so-called third way between the welfare state and 
neoliberalism. The basic assumption behind its conceptualization is that 
unattended laissez-faire capitalism leads to increasing disorder and criminality, 
increase of poverty and inequality demanding some form of state intervention. 
With regard to the proposed guideline of this approach to the regulation of 
welfare benefits is that the emphasis is put on the axiom of individual 
responsibility and the idea that rights involves duties. Although not entirely new 
in the context of welfare state paternalism it more forcefully imposes obligations 
on the recipients of benefits. To a certain extent, while the discourse is based on 
a critique of the paternalistic welfare administration, this nevertheless represents 
an experiment in social engineering. For as MacGregor writes, it involves a 
transformation of the mentality of individuals as well as of the responsibility of 
society: 
 
The main stress is on getting the poor and those receiving public 
services to change their behavior and act more responsibly. It is 
assumed that irresponsibility is the cause of their problems. The 
idea has been abandoned that the better-off might have 
obligations to the sick, and that the lucky should aid the unlucky 
(MacGregor 1999: 108). 
 
With regard to the role of the state in the economy, this approach does not 
entirely rely on cutting back all forms of market interference such as tax 
reduction, relaxation of labor rights and capital controls. Taking its cue from the 
former US secretary of labor, Robert Reich (1992), the strategy towards labor is 
one of upskilling the work force in the most productive sectors by investment in 
human capital formation and technological research with the aim of achieving a 
shaped advantage in trading relations with other economies. While unaltered 
competitive austerity resulting from the implementation of neoliberalism as an 
economic strategy leads to a race to the bottom, the proposed strategy of 
progressive competitiveness (Panitch 1994:81-86; Albo 1994:144-170) as 
developed by moderate social democracy aims at creating the conditions for a 
race to the top. Nevertheless the thinking behind this strategy is not without 
serious shortcomings and contradictions and will most probably lead to the same 
results as the competitive austerity of neoliberalism. (Albo 1994:144-170) The 
weakness of the progressive competitiveness approach favored by the so-called 
proponent of the Third Way is related to the presumption that employment has 
become a primary function of skill adjustments to technological change and not 
a result of the difficulties created by the tendency toward surplus capacity and 
overproduction. According to Leo Panitch (1994:83) some of the shortcomings 
of this strategy are related to the belief that employment growth in the high tech 
sectors can be sufficient to offset the growing loss of jobs in other sectors. 
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Internationally, the assumption is of a massive world demand to accommodate 
the need for markets, which this strategy entails especially if it is implemented 
by large economies. In addition this raises issues of export of unemployment to 
those who have failed to implement the same strategy. Finally it does not take 
into account that capital can also adapt leading technologies in low wage 
economies and the ensuing competitive pressures on the different capitals would 
lead to pushing wages down also in the hi tech sectors as well as favoring limits 
on its contribution to the costs to the social adjustments which is so central to 
the logic of the strategy.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Put in the context of the mode of operation of the system, the ambivalence of 
policy-making in all types of capitalist societies is primarily due to the historical 
evidence that capitalism, regardless of its specific form, can only show sporadic 
effectiveness and considerable social costs once normalcy returns. 
Consequently, treating the difficulties of the different models of capitalism as 
temporary disorders in otherwise sound and viable trajectories of economic 
growth ignores history which shows that it is the brief periods of sustained and 
rapid growth that constitute deviations from the norm. Furthermore it is 
legitimate to ask whether it is ”realistic to expect a broad convergence of 
productivity and standard of living at the world level? Evidence suggests that 
globalization is limited to the core of industrialized countries –Europe, North 
America and Japan” (Boyer and Drache 1996: 2).  
 
The exceptionality of the golden age of capitalism and the East Asian NIC-
phenomenon appears to have been grasped neither by policy-makers nor by 
organized labor in the three exemplars of industrial capitalism. In addition, this 
particular period of general economic growth has become the point of reference 
for the future on the part of the populations in all types of societies. The 
revolution of rising expectations, which took place, will be confronted with the 
limitations of the economic performance, which is affecting the international 
system of capitalism. This is bound to have unpredictable fallouts and reserves 
surprises for the unprepared and uninitiated political forces. As David Coates 
puts it in the conclusion to his analysis of the capitalist economic models: 
 
… each of the major exemplars of that system’s postwar success 
face deeply rooted and structurally induced limits to their 
contemporary and future capacity to meet those expectations, in 
even the most modern form; and because they do, the one thing 
of which we can be certain is that the politics of the left in the 
first years of the new millennium will need to be significantly 
more determined, and more radical, if we are truly to prevent the 
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legacy of the past sitting like a nightmare on the brain of the 
living (Coates 2000:234). 
 
The implication is to recognize the limits of capitalism as a universal and 
unavoidable socio-economic system, which under the neoliberal globalization 
discourse promotes a ”kind of organized irresponsibility”. (Beck 2001) 
 
While anti-socialism was an important element behind Keynesian welfare 
capitalism and East Asian developmentalism, the need to rethink alternative 
visions and practices will demand to be placed ever more urgently on agenda. 
Going ”back to the future” as proposed by New Keynesianism or 
developmentalism simply will not do. 
 
What is at stake is first and foremost to acknowledge that it is not the removal of 
market failure or governing the market that is at issue. Such an approach, in the 
last instance, relegitimizes capitalism as a socio-economic system based on class 
and competition thereby representing more of an alternance than an alternative 
to real existing capitalism. The need is to surmount Polanyi’s double movement 
between liberalism and statism. As two economists from the New School for 
Social Research put it in their discussion of the crisis of vision in the ”dismal 
science” of economics: 
 
For the Keynesian classical situation … was based on a vision 
whose central message was not so much the endemic 
dysfunctionality of the capitalist order … but the ensuing 
conclusion that the use of government powers of demand 
management would be the only remedy capable of setting the 
disorder to right (Heilbroner and Milberg 1995:115).  
 
It should not be forgotten that welfare under the golden era for both the 
macroeconomic regulatory state and the developmentalist state was based on a 
productivist workfare conceptualization of modern capitalism. 
 
The need to find a way of transgressing the capital-labor nexus can be said to be 
the precondition for the most radical break with history. The experience of 
socialist states which were characterized by a form of ownership structure 
allowing the emergence of a kind of managerial-party functionary class who 
could benefit from their functions without having direct property rights to the 
means of production. (Bettelheim 1975) This type of hybrid society, represents a 
prototype of ”capitalism without capitalists”, a term formulated by Engels to 
criticize  the project of the Second International but which  can also be applied 
to the Soviet case.(Amin 1997: 15) Related to the problematique of the 
emancipation project it signifies that the transgression of the capital-labor 
18 
relationship needs to go beyond the vision of the Communist Manifesto where 
Marx and Engels emphasized the ownership question: ”The Communist 
revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no 
wonder that its development involves the most radical rupture with traditional 
ideas” (Marx and Engels ([1848] 1958:53).  
 
Consequently, the question that has to be resolved in order to surmount the 
dichotomy of welfare and workfare concerns the conflict between the 
expropriation of people’s means of subsistence and the continuous dependency 
of labor power as a market commodity. This has been a determinant component 
of capitalism. As noted by, among others, Karl Polanyi, the commodity 
character of labor puts workers at the mercy of the demand of capital. The 
commodity has little control as to where, why and how it will be used or not 
used.  
 
Although the ideological discourse of modern capitalism has sought to embed 
work as an individual psychological need, it overlooks the subsistence nexus, 
which forces workers to sell their labor power. This was recognized already in 
the early age of industrial capitalism. In the words of Bishop Whately: ”When a 
man begs for work he asks not for work but for wages.”(Quoted in Polanyi 
[1944] 1957:177) But acknowledgement of the social consequences of the 
dependency of labor on the sale of its power in order to obtain its means of 
subsistence has remained concealed in mainstream economics as it could affect 
the hegemonic democracy discourse. As one of the fathers of neoliberalism, 
Ludwig von Mises, noted: ”It has occurred to no one that a lack of wages would 
be a better term than a lack of employment, for what the unemployed person 
misses is not work but the remuneration of work” (quoted in Polanyi [1944] 
1957:176). 
 
It is an irony of history that the “Right to Work” has been celebrated as a great 
victory by the labor movement and socialist political forces in industrial 
societies. But having imposed this right, workers landed in a “prisoner’s 
dilemma” situation whereby the essence of capitalist exploitation of labor was 
cemented politically and ideologically. Thus, the defensive struggle for the 
protection and betterment of the conditions of the working class could not be 
anything but a “guerilla war” without possible victory as long as the issue 
remained at the level of salaries instead of the abolition of the wage system 
altogether. Voices within the socialist movement were aware of this impasse. In 
an address to the “General Council of the International Working Men’s 
Association” in London in 1865, Karl Marx made the following remark, which 
however didn’t have much impact later on the Second Socialist Internationals 
nor on the Third International: 
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They (labor organizations) ought, therefore, not to be exclusively 
absorbed in these unavoidable guerilla fights, incessantly 
springing up from the never-ceasing encroachment of capital or 
changes of the market. They ought to understand that, with all the 
miseries it imposes upon them, the present system 
simultaneously engenders the material conditions and the social 
forms necessary for an economical reconstruction of society. 
Instead of the conservative motto, “A fair day’s wage for a fair 
day’s work!” they ought to inscribe on their banner the 
revolutionary watchword, “Abolition of the wages system!” 
(Marx [1898] 1958, 448). 
 
The other side of the coin was the degeneration of anti-capitalist forces and the 
corruption of the proletariat by capitalist morality. Voicing outrage at this state 
of affairs within the workers’ movement, the son-in-law of Karl Marx, Paul 
Lafargue published Le droit à la paresse ([1880] 1969) in order to mobilize 
workers and give them a vision beyond selling their work and themselves.  
 
In the second half of the 20th century, while wage labor has been internalized by 
the working classes, social protection in the West and economic nationalism in 
East Asia sought to mediate the relationship between capital and labor by 
making the burden more bearable for workers and their dependents or 
mobilizing their nationalist sentiments. Although the production level has never 
been higher than during this period, neither welfare capitalism nor 
developmentalist capitalism have sought the emancipation of labor from the 
insecurity related to capitalist production relations. In later years there have been 
discussions in European circles about the conceptualization and implementation 
of a strategy in especially advanced industrialized societies, which would break 
the capital-labor nexus. This is considered to be a path to surmount the absurdity 
of living and working in societies characterized by overconsumerism without 
though having overcome insecurity and alienation, which is created by the 
organization of labor power as a commodity. According to this way of thinking 
the inherent tendency of economic overproduction together with the challenge of 
ecological crises related to the globalization of capitalism make it imperative to 
develop a radical alternative to the capitalist mode of functioning based on 
capital accumulation. This is where the concept of ”citizen wage” or ”living 
wage” offers a possible path to emancipation which productivistic ideologies 
and strategies have ignored. In essence this idea whose time has come to be put 
on the agenda may represent ”the most radical rupture with traditional ideas” 
which consequently challenges both the traditional labor movement as well as 
capitalist market forces (Brun 2000). 
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